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Abstract
This paper studies the effectiveness of interim information in reduc-
ing inefficiencies in long term relationships. If the interim information
is verifiable, it resolves all problems of asymmetric information. Un-
der nonverifiability, the information alleviates the contracting problem
only partially and its optimal use depends on the signal’s accuracy and
timing. Precise and early signals enable the principal to extract all
rents and adjust allocations closer to the first best. Imprecise or late
signals affect only future allocations and leaves the agent with a rent.
Due to a failure of the revelation principle, the optimal contract under
non–verifiability is derived by employing the theory of communication
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades economists have identified pre–contractual asymmetric
information as an important source of inefficiency. Most analyses, however,
disregard the fact that contracts are typically long term and require repeated
interaction during which contracting partners receive additional information.
Since such interim information may reduce the initial degree of asymmetric
information, rational economic agents have an interest in taking it into ac-
count when designing their contracts. Real–life examples of these contracts
are probation contracts for new employers and accident free discounts in in-
surance.1 This paper investigates the role of interim information in reducing
inefficiencies.
More specifically, I analyze a standard principal agent setting in which
the agent is privately information about his type. During their contractual
relationship the principal receives additional information about the agent. I
thereby contrast the case where this information is verifiable to one in which
it is not. The difference being that the contract can only condition on the
information directly if it is verifiable. The paper shows that when the interim
information is verifiable, it completely mitigates the problems associated with
pre–contractual asymmetric information. That is, independent of the accu-
racy of the information and its timing, the optimal contract implements first
best allocations and the principal extracts all rents.
In contrast, when the principal’s interim information is non–verifiable,
the effect of interim information depends on its accuracy and timing. When
the information has a low accuracy or is received late in the relationship, the
principal uses the interim information primarily for rent extraction, but fails
to extract all rents. Moreover, the interim information affects only the allo-
cations that occur after the information has been received; earlier allocations
remain at their second best levels. In contrast, when the information is more
1See Cooper and Hayes (1987) for a concrete analysis of a car insurance model in which
accidents provide verifiable interim information about the agent’s type.
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accurate or received earlier, the principal extracts all rents. In this case, the
presence of interim information also affect earlier allocations; they are closer
to the first best than without the information.
In addition, the assumption of non–verifiability requires a different an-
alytical approach to the problem. When the information is verifiable, one
may solve the contracting problem by using the revelation principle and focus
on truthful direct mechanisms. This familiar procedure cannot be followed
when the principal’s interim information is nonverifiable. In this case, the
principal can only be induced to reveal her information so that information
revelation becomes a strategic decision to which the principal cannot commit
herself contractually.2
Faced with a failure of the revelation principle, this paper uses an alter-
native justification for its focus on truthful direct mechanisms. In particular,
it employs the theory of communication equilibrium (e.g. Forges (1986) and
Myerson (1986)) to show that, despite the principal’s lack of commitment,
truthful direct mechanisms are optimal.3 This literature shows that, when
players have private information and imperfect commitment, the introduc-
tion of a benevolent mediator, who receives the parties’ information and
gives subsequent recommendations, restores the revelation principle. In gen-
eral however such mediators may allow players to attain outcomes which they
cannot reach through direct communication.4 In the current setting however
the outcome of the optimal mediated contract may also be implemented by
an unmediated one. From this it then follows that the optimal mediated
2See Bester and Strausz (2001) for more details about the failure of the revelation
principle when a principal has imperfect commitment.
3Since interim information exemplifies a setting in which a player receives new infor-
mation over time, it uses Myerson (1986)’s theory of multistage games which represents
the dynamic version of the communication literature.
4This has lead to the observation that “mediated contracts” may yield contracting par-
ties strictly more than “unmediated” ones (e.g., Bester and Strausz (2003)). Consequently,
Mitusch and Strausz (2001) raise the fundamental question whether the appropriate ap-
proach to solving such contracting problems is one with or without a mediator.
3
and optimal unmediated contract coincide and truthful direct mechanisms
are optimal.
Since the interim signal is correlated with the agent’s type, it presents
a natural example of correlated information. Hence, the paper is related
to the literature on the use of correlated information, which demonstrates
how correlated information mitigates the problem of private information (e.g.
Cremer and McLean 1988 and Riordan and Sappington 1988). The current
paper contributes to this literature by emphasizing the role of verifiability.
It is important to note that the literature has studied a different type
of interim information. Baron and Besanko (1984) analyze a multi period
adverse selection setting in which interim information revelation occurs due
to the agent’s behavior. Specifically, if the principal offers a revelation mech-
anism in the first period, the agent’s message entails interim information. In
the framework of Baron and Besanko the revelation of interim information
lies under the full control of the agent and is therefore endogenous. In this
case, interim information does not benefit the principal. Indeed, Baron and
Besanko show that whenever the principal has full commitment, her optimal
policy is to commit not to use interim information. Hence, the current pa-
per differs from the literature on the ratchet effect (e.g., Laffont and Tirole
1988, 1990) in which, due to the principal’s limited commitment, the interim
information actually hurts the principal and repeated interaction should be
avoided. In contrast, this paper explicitly allows the possibility of long term
contracts and commitment. The comparison emphasizes that there exists a
crucial difference between endogenous and exogenous information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up a
simple framework of interim information. Section 3 develops two benchmarks
against which we may set the use of interim information. Section 4 analyzes
interim information when it is verifiable, while Section 5 studies it under
non–verifiability. The final section concludes. All formal proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
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2 The Setup
A principal employs an agent, who is privately informed about the marginal
cost of production. With probability α the agent’s marginal cost is θl and
with probability 1−α the marginal cost is θh, where θh > θl. The agent’s ac-
tion a results in a verifiable output v(a). We make the standard assumptions
that v is increasing and concave, i.e., v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0, and, for technical
reasons, v′′′ < 0.
The agent works for the principal for two periods, where we normalize the
total length of the relationship to one. The first period of production lasts for
a time δ ∈ (0, 1), after which the principal receives a signal s ∈ {h, l} about
the agent’s marginal cost. The signal s represents the interim information,
while the parameter δ reflects the time at which the principal receives it. The
signal is correct with probability p > 1/2 so that p represents its accuracy.
The second period of production lasts for the remaining time 1−δ. Note that
the only difference between the two periods is the disclosure of the signal s.
Without the signal the model is equivalent to a standard, one-period adverse
selection problem.5
As the owner of the firm, the principal receives the agent’s output and
compensates him with a wage w. The principal and agent are risk neutral.
Given that the agent receives wages (w1, w2) during the two periods and
chooses actions (a1, a2) the principal’s and agent’s payoffs are
V (w1, a1, w2, a2) = δ(v(a1)− w1) + (1− δ)(v(a2)− w2),
Ui(w1, a1, w2, a2) = δ(w1 − θia1) + (1− δ)(w2 − θia2),
respectively, where i ∈ {h, l}.
Since output is verifiable and invertible, we may interpret an enforceable
contract γ as specifying an action a and a wage w for each period, i.e. γ =
5For a formal argument see Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 103-105) and also Baron and
Besanko (1984, p. 290).
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(γ1, γ2) = ((w1, a1), (w2, a2)). As is standard, the contract may depend on a
message m of the agent about his type. If the principal’s interim information
s is verifiable, the contract may condition directly on it. In this case, the
contract has the form γms = (γ1(m), γ2(m, s)). When the information is
unverifiable, the contract can depend only indirectly on the signal, in the
sense that the principal may report it by sending some message r. That is, a
general contract has the form γmr = (γ1(m), γ2(m, r)). The principal offers
the contract as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent. The agent’s reservation
utility is normalized to zero.
3 First and Second Best
This section analyzes two benchmarks to which I will later relate the existence
of interim information. The benchmarks show that without the signal s, the
model collapses to a static one. This emphasizes that the model allows a
straightforward evaluation of the existence of interim information.
First, suppose the principal is fully informed about the agent’s type. In
this case, the principal can prescribe each type of agent to work efficiently
and appropriate the entire surplus. Efficient, first best action levels, afbi ,
satisfy
v′(afbi ) = θi,
with i ∈ {h, l}.6 Hence, with full information the optimal contract γ is a first
best contract that implements in each period the respective first best action
levels afbi at first best costs θia
fb
i . Note that the prescribed actions levels are
time–invariant and that the two period model is identical to a static one with
full information.
Now assume the agent is privately informed about his type and the signal
s is not available. As shown by Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont and
Tirole (1993, p.103-105) the optimal long term contract is, in this second best
6Throughout the paper we assume that the solution of the problem is interior.
6
world, again time–invariant. The two period model is identical to a standard
one period model of adverse selection in which the principal faces the familiar
trade–off between efficiency and rent extraction. By the revelation principle
an optimal contract is a solution to the following maximization problem:7
P0: max V = α(v(al)− wl) + (1− α)(v(ah)− wh)
s.t. wl − θlal ≥ 0;wh − θhah ≥ 0 (1)
wl − θlal ≥ wh − θlah; wh − θhah ≥ wl − θhal, (2)
where (1) represent the participation constraints and (2) the incentive con-
straints that ensure truthful revelation. Let V sb denote the solution to P0.
By standard arguments only the incentive constraint of the efficient type θl
and the participation constraint of the inefficient type θh are binding. The
solution to this problem is a second best contract that implements the second
best action levels (asbl , a
sb
h ). As is standard, the efficient type receives a strict
positive information rent U sbl > 0, while his action is efficient (a
sb
l = a
fb
l ).
The inefficient type does not receive a rent U sbh = 0, but uses an action, a
sb
h ,
which is below his efficient level, afbh , where
v′(asbh ) = θh +
α
1− α
(θh − θl). (3)
4 Verifiable Information
This section studies the optimal use of the interim signal s when it is ver-
ifiable. Verifiability implies that a general contract has the form γms =
(γ1(m), γ2(m, s)). In this case interim information is extremely powerful: In-
dependent of its accuracy p, and the time δ, at which it is received, it is able
to resolve the problem of ex ante asymmetric information completely.
To demonstrate this, the section first derive the optimal contract and,
for later references, discusses its properties. By the revelation principle an
7To have a non–trivial problem, we assume throughout this paper that the principal
wants to employ both agents, which is the case if α is small enough.
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optimal contract may be represented by a direct mechanism γθs = (γls, γhs)
that ensures truthful revelation of the agent’s type. The principal’s utility
from such a direct mechanism is
V ≡ α(pV (γll) + (1− p)V (γlh)) + (1− α)(pV (γhh) + (1− p)V (γhl)).(4)
The direct mechanism γθs has to induce the agent to reveal his type truthfully.
I.e., the following two incentive compatibility conditions have to hold
pUl(γll) + (1− p)Ul(γlh) ≥ pUl(γhl) + (1− p)Ul(γhh); (5)
pUh(γhh) + (1− p)Uh(γhl) ≥ pUh(γlh) + (1− p)Uh(γll), (6)
where condition (5) ensures that the agent of type l reveals himself truthfully
and (6) induces type θh to report himself truthfully.
Finally, the contract must ensure acceptance by both types of agents, i.e.,
pUl(γll) + (1− p)Ul(γlh) ≥ 0; (7)
pUh(γhh) + (1− p)Uh(γhl) ≥ 0. (8)
Hence, a solution to the following maximization problem solves the prin-
cipal’s problem:
P1: max V
s.t. (5), (6), (7), and (8).
Proposition 1 If the signal s is verifiable, then for any p > 1/2 and any
δ ∈ (0, 1) the principal can implement the first best actions at first best costs.
With a verifiable signal the principal is able to attain her first best payoff.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. As shown in the previous
section, the principal’s problem without the signal s is to pick a menu that
does not give the efficient type θl an incentive to claim he is inefficient. With
the signal s this problem can be solved costlessly by conditioning second
period wages, whs, on the signal s. Indeed, by setting whh > whl the contract
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that is meant for type θh becomes relatively less attractive to type θl. The
efficient type θl would receive the higher wage whh only with probability
1−p < 1/2, whereas type θh receives it with probability p > 1/2. A difference
∆wh ≡ whh − whl of
∆w¯h ≡
(θh − θl)a
fb
h
(1− δ)(2p− 1)
(9)
is sufficient to make the first best allocations incentive compatible. Indeed,
from the incentive compatibility constraint (5) it directly follows that the
positive wedge of at least ∆w¯h is a necessary condition for contracts to attain
the first best.
Corollary 1 First best actions are implementable only with a wedge ∆wh of
at least ∆w¯h
A direct comparison with the second best solution shows that the interim
information affects both the first and second period action levels of the in-
efficient type θh. That is, even though the signal is received after the first
period, the signal influences the first period contract.
The result that the principal is able to implement the first best action
level is related to Riordan and Sappington (1988), who show how ex post
information may eliminate inefficiencies due to ex ante asymmetric informa-
tion. Indeed, from the perspective of the first period the interim information
may be seen as ex post information. Similarly, Cremer and McLean (1988)
show how an auctioneer may exploit the correlation between privately in-
formed bidders to extract the complete surplus. As in Cremer and McLean
(1988) the signal s is correlated with the agent’s private information and the
principal uses a similar scheme to exploit this correlation. The next section
shows however that the result depends crucially on the verifiability of the
signal.8
8See Demougin and Garvie (1991), Gary–Bobo and Spiegel (2003), and Kessler et al.
(2004) for the use of correlated information when parties have limited liability.
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5 Unverifiable Information
This section analyzes intermediate information when it is unverifiable. In
this case, the contract γ cannot depend directly on the signal s. Instead,
the second period contract can at most depend on a report by the principal
about her signal s. Intuitively, the principal’s report can, in equilibrium, only
matter if she reveals her signal truthfully. Hence, it seems natural to look
for optimal revelation games that induce a truthful revelation of the agent’s
and principal’s information.
Formally, an (unmediated) revelation game Γu(γ) is generated by a con-
tract γ = (γ1(m), γ2(m, r)) and describes the following game: First the agent
sends a message m ∈ {h, l} to the principal. The message m determines the
first period allocation γ1(m). In the second period the principal sends, after
receiving her private signal s ∈ {h, l}, a report r ∈ {h, l}. The report r
together with the agent’s message m determines the second period allocation
γ2(m, r). We say that an (unmediated) revelation game Γ
u(γ) is truthful if it
has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the agent and the principal re-
port their private information truthfully. Moreover, a truthful (unmediated)
revelation game Γu(γ) is acceptable if it has a truthful equilibrium that yields
both types of agents at least their reservation utility of zero.
Whether a game Γu(γ) is truthful and acceptable depends on the un-
derlying contract γ. In a truthful equilibrium of a game Γu(γ), the agent’s
message is fully revealing. In particular, after receiving a message m, the
principal knows that the agent is of type m. Hence, before sending her re-
port r the principal is fully informed about the agent’s type. In a truthful
revelation game the principal must nevertheless have an incentive to reveal
her information truthfully. To the principal the difference in payoffs between
reporting r = l and reporting r = h is
(v(aml)− wml)− (v(amh)− wmh).
This difference is independent of the principal’s actual signal s. That is,
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whenever this difference is positive, the principal has a strict incentive to
report r = l. If it is negative, she has a strict incentive to report r = h.
Hence, in a truthful unmediated revelation game Γu(γ) the difference must
be zero. I.e., it must hold that
v(all)− wll = v(alh)− wlh. (10)
v(ahl)− whl = v(ahh)− whh. (11)
In a truthful revelation game also the agent has to reveal his information.
Given that the principal reveals her information truthfully, the earlier condi-
tions (5) and (6) express this requirement. Finally, if the truthful revelation
game Γu(γ) is to be acceptable, the contract γ must satisfy equations (7) and
(8).
Consequently, we define an optimal (unmediated) revelation contract γu
as a contract which induces an acceptable, truthfully unmediated revelation
game Γu(γu) that yields the principal the highest payoff. That is, γu solves
the following problem
P2: max
γ
V (γ)
s.t. (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (11).
We call an (unmediated) revelation contract γ that satisfies the constraints
of program P2 feasible. We denote by V u ≡ V (γu) the maximum payoff
which the principal can achieve in an unmediated revelation game.
Although our focus on truthful revelation games may seem natural, it is
unclear whether they are indeed optimal. To ensure this one must show the
solution to problem P2 is also optimal with respect to mechanisms that do
not induce truthful revelation. As in Section 4 this normally follows from the
revelation principle. Yet, because the principal has imperfect commitment
concerning her reporting behavior, the principle does not apply.9
9For instance, a game in which the agent only takes an action after the principal
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However, we may use an indirect argument to show that, despite imper-
fect commitment, truthful revelation games are nevertheless optimal. The
first step in showing this is to recognize that the setting with unverifiable in-
formation is an example of a multi–stage game as defined in Myerson (1986).
Following Myerson (1986) we may use the concept of communication equi-
librium and solve a relaxed version of the principal’s contracting problem.
Effectively, this allows the principal to use a mediator for contract execution,
where a mediator is a device that receives signals (information) from players
and gives players recommendations about their play.10 It is well known that
in general mediators may be strictly beneficial to a principal with imperfect
commitment, in the sense that the principal is unable to implement the opti-
mal mediated contract without an explicit mediator (e.g. Bester and Strausz
(2003) and Mitusch and Strausz (2001)). However, in the specific setup this
does not occur and the principal may implement the optimal mediated con-
tract by an unmediated revelation contract.
The advantage of introducing a mediator in the principal’s problem is
that it restores the revelation principle. Following Myerson (1986 and 1991, p.
296–298)), one may show that any equilibrium outcome of any game between
the principal and the agent is an equilibrium outcome of some incentive
compatible, direct mechanism involving a mediator, who induces the players
to report their types truthfully. This revelation principle for Bayesian games
implies that, we may, without loss of generality, restrict attention to the
following type of revelation game:
In the first period t = 1 the agent sends a message m about his type to
the mediator. The mediator then executes the first period contract in that he
reports his information may have an equilibrium outcome in which the agent’s action is
type–dependent. In such an equilibrium the principal’s revelation strategy will depend on
her beliefs. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome of such a game cannot be achieved by
a truthful revelation game.
10Since the agent’s action is contractible, the mediator will prescribe rather than rec-
ommend the action to the agent.
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implements the contractual first period allocation γ1(m). Without observing
either the agent’s message nor the prescribed allocation γ1(m), the principal
reports his signal s ∈ {h, l} to the mediator. Subsequently, the mediator
implements the second period allocation γ2(m, r).
Effectively, the difference between an unmediated and a mediated reve-
lation game is whether the principal actually observes the message and/or
the first period allocation before sending her own report. Therefore, in an
unmediated revelation game the principal learns from the agent’s behavior,
whereas in a mediated revelation game she does not.
Formally, a mediated revelation game Γm(γ) is a Bayesian game between
the principal and the agent that is generated by a contract γ = (γ1(m), γ2(m, r)).
It has the following structure. The agent has two possible actions m ∈ {h, l}
and may be of two types, i.e. the type space is Ta = {h, l}. Similarly, also
the principal has two actions r ∈ {h, l} and may also be of two types, i.e.
Tp = {h, l}. The agent’s type–dependent payoff functions are
uh(m, r) = Uh(wm, am, wmr, amr) and ul(m, r) = Ul(wm, am, wmr, amr);
while the principal’s payoff functions are
vh(m, r) = vl(m, r) = V (wm, am, wmr, amr).
Note that, the principal’s payoff is actually type–independent.
To complete the description of the Bayesian game Γm(γ), we must specify
the ex ante beliefs of the players. Since the principal’s signal s is correct
with probability p, the Bayes’ consistent belief of an agent of type i that the
principal is of type i is p(i|i) = p. The belief of a principal of type h that the
agent is of type l follows from Bayes’ rule as
νh =
ν(1− p)
ν(1− p) + (1− ν)p
.
Likewise, the belief of a principal of type l that the agent is of type l is
νl =
νp
νp+ (1− ν)(1− p)
.
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The beliefs (p, ν) completes the description of the Bayesian game Γm(γ).
Continuing previous terminology, a mediated revelation game Γm(γ) is
truthful, if it has an equilibrium in which the agent’s message and the prin-
cipal’s report are both truthful. In a truthful equilibrium of a truthful medi-
ated revelation game Γm(γ), the equilibrium outcome coincides with γ and
the principal’s ex ante equilibrium payoff is V (γ).
Whether a game Γm(γ) is truthful depends on its generating contract γ.
In particular, the contract γ must satisfy constraints (5) and (6) if the agent
is to reveal his type truthfully. Similarly, a principal of type h reveals her
type truthfully if
νhV (γlh) + (1− νh)V (γhh) ≥ νhV (γll) + (1− νh)V (γhl). (12)
Likewise, a principal of type l reveals her type truthfully if
νlV (γll) + (1− νl)V (γhl) ≥ νlV (γlh) + (1− νl)V (γhh). (13)
An important observation is that as a system the constraints (12) and
(13) simplify to
v(all)− wll ≥ v(alh)− wlh. (14)
v(ahl)− whl ≥ v(ahh)− whh. (15)
Finally, a truthful mediated revelation game Γm(γ) is acceptable, if it
yields the agent at least his reservation utility of zero. That is, for a contract
γ the inequalities (7) and (8) must be satisfied.
By the revelation principal for Bayesian games we may find an optimal
mediated contract γm by solving the following maximization program:
P3: max
γ
V (γ)
s.t. (5), (6), (7), (8), (14), (15).
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Let V m ≡ V (γm) denote the maximum of program P3. Note that the reve-
lation principle guarantees that V m represents the maximum payoff that the
principal can attain in any mediated contracting game. Hence, V m denotes
the principal’s maximum payoff of any mediated contract.
Program P2 and P3 differ only in the principal’s incentive constraints.
More specifically, program P2 obtains from program P3 by the additional
requirement that constraints (14) and (15) are satisfied in equality. Hence,
program P2 is more constrained than program P3. This confirms that V m ≥
V u. Yet, if a solution γm of program P3 exists such that constraints (14)
and (15) are satisfied in equality then γm is also feasible in the unmediated
revelation game. It follows that unmediated revelation games are optimal
despite the failure of the revelation principle for such games. Moreover,
γm represents an optimal contract of the original (unmediated) contracting
problem.
As a first step, the following lemma shows that any solution to program
P3 satisfies condition (15) in equality. The reason is that if condition (15)
does not restrict the principal’s problem, she could implement the first best,
which, by Corollary 1, requires wages that violate the constraint.
Lemma 1 For any solution γm to program P3 the constraint (15) is binding.
In contrast, condition (14) does not restrict the problem, but we may
show that it can be satisfied costlessly through an appropriate distribution
of the wages wll and wlh. The intuition for this is that because the incentive
constraint of type h does not bind, one may freely distribute type l’s wage
between wll and wlh to satisfy condition (14) in equality without affecting
incentives and payoffs. Hence, we may find a solution γm to P3 that is also
feasible for problem P2 and therefore represents an optimal (unmediated)
contract. The following proposition characterizes the solution in relation to
p and δ.
15
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Figure 1: Utilities with nonverifiability
Proposition 2 There exists a p¯(δ) ∈ (1/2, 1/(1 + α)) such that for all
p < p¯(δ) the optimal contract leaves the efficient agent a positive rent and
prescribes action levels ahl < ah = a
sb
h < ahh. For p > p¯(δ) the optimal con-
tract extracts all rents and the first period action level, ah, is more efficient
than the 2nd best asbh . For p = 1/2 the solution coincides with the second
best. For p = 1 the solution yields the first best. Moreover, p¯′(δ) > 0.
The proposition shows that, despite unverifiability, the principal benefits
from interim information by adjusting the second period allocations ahh and
ahl. Surprisingly, the principal adjusts the first period allocation ah only
if the signal is informative enough. These results may be explained by re-
considering the fundamental trade–off between efficiency and rent extraction
that is responsible for the distortion in the original adverse selection model.
If the signal reveals little information, the principal must leave an informa-
tion rent to the efficient type. Hence, the principal still faces the standard
trade–off between efficiency and rent extraction. With respect to the first
period, however, the interim information does not change this trade–off and
the allocation ah remains, therefore, at its second best level.
11 In contrast,
11A marginal change in ah raises efficiency by v
′(ah) − θh, but requires an increase
in the information rent of θh − θl. Evaluating changes by their respective probabilities,
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the trade–offs concerning the second period allocations ahh and ahl do depend
on the accuracy of the signal. Indeed, since an inefficient type receives the
allocation ahh more often than a (lying) efficient agent would, the trade–off
with respect to ahh changes in favor of the efficiency effect. Hence, as p rises,
the efficiency argument gains in importance relative to the rent extraction
argument and, as a result, the principal adjusts the second period allocation
ahh closer to the first best. For the allocation ahl the contrary happens. Here
the rent extraction problem intensifies relatively to the efficiency effect, and
leads the principal to distort the allocation further away from the first best.
As of p¯(δ) the signal is informative enough to extract all information rents.
As a consequence, there is no longer a trade–off between efficiency and rent
extraction. To see that this implies that the principal now also adjusts ah,
suppose that the principal did choose allocations on the basis of the previous
trade–off. In this case, the signal is so informative that the corresponding
contract violates the efficient type’s individual rationality. Hence, if the prin-
cipal wants to implement these allocation, she must raise the efficient type’s
wages. This, however, results in a slack incentive compatibility constraint.
But since the need for incentive compatibility actually causes the distortion
on type θh’s allocations, its slackness allows the principal to adjust them
closer to the first best.
Figure 1 illustrates how the utility of the principal and the efficient type
θl depend on the accuracy of the signal s. For p = 1/2 the signal is un-
informative and the principal’s utility coincides with the second best. As
p increases, the signal s becomes more informative and relaxes the agent’s
incentive constraint. In the range of 1/2 to pˆ the principal’s uses the signal
to reduce the information rent to the agent. At p = p¯(δ) the information rent
is completely extracted and the individual rationality constraint of the effi-
cient agent becomes binding. From p¯(δ) onwards, the principal reduces the
the principal net gain from a change in ah is (1 − α)δ(v
′(ah) − θh) − δα(θh − θl). It is
independent of p and, at the optimum, must be zero, leading to the first order condition
(3).
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allocative distortions. At p = 1 all distortions disappear and the principal
achieves the first best.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper studied the use of interim information. The occurrence of such
information is a natural characteristic of most long term contractual relation-
ship. In fact, it may be the very reason why economic agents enter into long
term contractual relationships rather than transact on anonymous spot mar-
kets in which such information cannot be used. Interim information mitigates
the adverse selection problem. Hence, in repeated contractual relationships
that start under asymmetric information the adverse selection problem may
be less problematic than the standard static model suggests.
When interim information is unverifiable, the principal may look for ways
to circumvent the non–verifiability. One approach is to delegate the signal
gathering to a third party who reports the signal to the principal. If the third
party’s report is truthful and verifiable, the signal itself becomes verifiable.
Hence, non–verifiability creates incentives to delegate. However, delegation
may involve additional costs. First, the third party must be given incentives
to report his signal truthfully. A problem that is possibly exacerbated by
collusive pressures between the principal and the third party.12 Second, in
general the employment of a third party will be costly in itself. The princi-
pal’s decision whether to delegate will therefore explicitly depend on a com-
parison between the solution with delegation to the one without delegation
as derived here.
12See Strausz (1997) for an approach to model these pressures explicitly.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the contract γ∗ with ah = ahh =
ahl = a
fb
h , al = alh = all = a
fb
l , and wages whh =
a
fb
h
(pθh−(1−p)θl)
(1−δ)(2p−1)
, whl =
a
fb
h
(pθl−(1−p)θh)
(1−δ)(2p−1)
, wh = wl = 0, wll = wlh = θla
fb
l /(1− δ). The contract γ
∗ gives
each type of agent an incentive to report his type truthfully. Moreover, each
type receives his reservation utility such that the contract implements the
first best at first best costs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: In the first best it holds, by definition, that ah =
ahh = ahl = a
fb
h , al = all = alh = a
fb
l and that constraints (7) and (8) bind.
Incentive compatibility constraint (5) may therefore be rewritten as
(1− δ)[pwhl + (1− p)whh] ≤ θla
fb
h .
Moreover, a binding (8) implies (1−δ)[pwhh+(1−p)whl] = θha
fb
h . Subtracting
this equation from the previous inequality and a rearrangement of terms
yields
(1− δ)(2p− 1)(whh − whl) ≥ (θh − θl)a
fb
h .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: First note that the contract γ∗ defined in the proof
of Proposition 1 satisfies all the constraints of P3 apart from (15). Hence, if
(15) does not restrict the optimum, the principal may obtain her first best
payoff. Since the principal cannot obtain more than her first best payoff,
the contract γ∗ must be a solution to P3. Moreover, since any contract that
yields first best payoffs and satisfies (7) and (8) must implement the first best
actions, any solution to the problem P3 without the constraint (15) exhibits
ah = ahl = ahh = a
fb
h . But according to Corollary 1 any implementation of
the first best actions requires whh − whl ≥ ∆w¯h > 0. Yet, this together with
ahl = ahh violates (15). Hence, (15) restricts the optimum. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: I solve problem P3 and show that its solution is
also feasible in P2. For p = 1/2 the constraints (5)-(8) represent standard
19
incentive and individual rationality constraints. In this case, (5) and (8)
imply (7). Our approach is therefore first to solve the relaxed problem
P3′ : max
γ
V s.t. (5), (8), and (15).
I show that for p close enough to 1/2 the solution satisfies the remaining
constraints (6), (7), (8), and (14), but that for p close to 1/(1 − α) the
solution violates (7). In the relaxed problem P3’, the three constraints are
all binding. First, (8) binds at the optimum, because otherwise one may
lower all wages by at least some ε > 0. By Lemma 1 also the constraint (15)
binds at the optimum. Finally, constraint (5) binds at the optimum, since
otherwise one can implement the first best.
Solving for the constraints (5), (8), and (15) yields
whh=ahlθh + δahθh/(1− δ) +(ahh − ahl)pθh +(1− p)(v(ahh)− v(ahl)) (16)
whl=ahlθh + δahθh/(1− δ) + (ahh − ahl)pθh − p(v(ahh)− v(ahl)) (17)
wll=
ahlθh + (alh − ahh)θl − wlh + (1− 2p)(v(ahh)− v(ahl))
p
+
δ(ahθh + (al − ah)θl)
(1− δ)p
+ (ahh − ahl)(θh + θl) + (all − alh)θl + wlh (18)
Substitution and a rearrangement of terms yields
V (p) ≡ α {δ[v(al)− alθl − ah(θh − θl)] + (1− δ)[p(v(all)− allθl)
+(1− p)(v(alh)− alhθl) + (2p− 1)(v(ahh)− v(ahl))
+((1− p)θl − pθh)ahh + (pθl − (1− p)θh)ahl]}
+(1− α) {δ[v(ah)− ahθh]
+(1− δ)[p(v(ahh)− ahhθh) + (1− p)(v(ahl)− ahlθh)]} .
Since this expression is independent of wlh we may, without affecting payoffs
or any other constraints, choose wll and wlh such that both (14) and (18) are
satisfied in equality.
The first order conditions with respect to al. is v
′(al.) = θl and implies
the first best action level afbl . The remaining first order conditions are
(1− α)[v′(ah)− θh] = α(θh − θl) (19)
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(1− (1 + α)p)[v′(ahl)− θh] = αp(θh − θl) (20)
(p− α(1− p))[v′(ahh)− θh] = α(1− p)(θh − θl). (21)
Since v′′ < 0, the second order conditions are satisfied for p < 1/(1 + α)
such that the equations (19), (20), and (21) define implicitly the solutions
a∗h(p), a
∗
hl(p), and a
∗
hh(p) of the relaxed problem.
More specifically, (19) shows that the optimal value for ah coincides with
the second best, i.e. a∗h(p) = a
sb
h , and is independent of p. For p = 1/2 the
first order conditions (20) and (21) also coincide with (3) such that a∗hl(1/2) =
a∗hh(1/2) = a
sb
h . Differentiating w.r.t. p and rearranging terms yields
∂a∗hl
∂p
=
(v′(a∗hl)− θh) + α(v
′(a∗hl)− θl)
(1− p− αp)v′′(a∗hl)
. (22)
and
∂a∗hh
∂p
=
α(v′(a∗hh)− θl) + (v
′(a∗hh)− θh)
−(p− α(1− p))v′′(a∗hh)
(23)
Due to (20) the numerator in (22) is positive and, for p < 1/(1 + α), the
denominator is negative. Hence, a∗hl(p) is decreasing in p for p < 1/(1 + α).
The numerator of (23) is positive due to v′(ahh) > θh > θl. The denomina-
tor is positive, because v′′(.) < 0. Hence, a∗hh(p) increases with p. Since
∂ahh/∂p > 0 and ∂ahl/∂p < 0 it follows for p ∈ (1/2, 1/(1 + α)) that
a∗hl(p) < ah(p) = a
sb
h < a
∗
hh(p).
We now check whether the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies the
individual rationality constraint (7) of agent l. Substitution of (16), (17),
and (18), yields
Ul(p) = (δah + (1− δ)((1− p)ahh + pahl))(θh − θl)
+(1− δ)(2p− 1)(Sh(ahl)− Sh(ahh)), (24)
where Si(a) ≡ v(a)−θia represents the joint surplus of the action a. Since the
solution for p = 1/2 coincides with the second best solution, the individual
rationality constraint is slack, i.e., Ul(1/2) > 0.
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Differentiating w.r.t. p and using (20)-(22) yields
U ′l (p) = −(1− δ)

[Sh(ahh)− Sh(ahl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+Sl(ahh)− Sl(ahl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]− (1− α)α(1− p)p×
(θh − θl)
2
[
1
(1− (1 + α)p)3v′′(ahl)
−
1
(p− (1− p)α)3v′′(ahh)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0


< 0.
The first term in the square brackets is negative since ahl < ahh < a
fb
h < a
fb
l
and Si(a) is increasing for a < a
fb
i . The second term in the square brackets
is non–positive since 1− (1 + α)p ≤ p− (1− p)α and v′′(ahh) ≤ v
′′(ahl) < 0,
due to v′′′ ≤ 0. Hence, starting from p = 1/2 the utility of type θl is
decreasing in p. As p approaches 1/(1 + α) the first part of the second term
in the square brackets approaches negative infinity. Hence, there exists some
p¯(δ) ∈ (1/2, 1/(1 + α)) such that
Ul(p¯(δ)) = 0.
Solving for p¯(δ) and differentiating with respect to δ yields
p¯′(δ) =
(θh − θl)ah
(1− δ)2((ahh − ahl)(θh − θl) + 2(Sh(ahh)− Sh(ahl)))
> 0.
Hence, the critical level p¯(δ) is increasing in δ.
For p > p¯(δ) the individual rationality constraint of type θl is binding
for p > p¯. By identical arguments the derivative of the right hand side of
(6) with respect to p equals U ′l (p). As the left hand is zero the constraint
remains satisfied as p rises. This shows that (6) is indeed slack.
To see that, as of p¯(δ), the principal reduces the distortion on the first
period allocation ah, consider the Lagrangian of a maximization of V (p)
subject to Ul(p) ≥ 0,
V (p) + λUl(p).
The first order condition with respect to ah yields
(1− α)(v′(ah(p))− th) = (α− λ(p))(θh − θl).
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Per definition the constraint becomes binding at p¯(δ) such that for p ≤ p¯ the
Kuhn-Tucker condition specify λ(p) = 0 so that ah(p) = a
sb
h . For p > p¯(δ)
the constraint is binding so that λ(p) > 0 and ah is closer to the first best.
It remains to be shown that for p = 1 the principal can achieve the first
best. Note that if p = 1 a contract γ with al = all = a
fb
l and ah = ahh = a
fb
h ,
wl = wll = θla
fb
l and wh = whh = θha
fb
h yields, if incentive compatible, the
principal the first best outcome. To ensure incentive compatibility we may
set ahl and alh large enough and whl = v(ahl) − v(ahh) + whh and wlh =
v(alh) + v(all)− wll to satisfy condition (14) and (15) in equality. Q.E.D.
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